In power since 2003 Lula thus arise in large combat of South America

The Bolivian gas crisis, in the aftermath of the nationalization of hydrocarbons by Evo Morales, is a heavy challenge for Brazilian diplomacy. The great neighbor, economic power in the region, is actually ringside. Both main investor and first customer of the Bolivia, which it is half the gas it consumes the Brazil sees its influence increasingly challenged in the region and must redefine its doctrine for its role in the world. While Lula is emerging as the interlocutor of Washington to ensure the stability of the region, Morales and Chavez will turn into enemy brothers.

Diplomats Brasilia traditionally tend to consider the leadership of their country as "natural". In power since 2003, Lula thus arise in large combat of South America. The objectives are very ambitious: bringing together peoples and integrate the concentric circles, with the epicenter area would just be Brasilia. According to this logic, it is important to strengthen and expand Mercosur, the common market of the Southern Cone, with the Argentina, the Uruguay and the Paraguay. The Bolivia and the Chile are associated, and the Venezuela is in the process of formal admission. In parallel, Mercosur tightening its relations with the Andean Community of nations, a little more to the North. The major project of political integration of Lula materialized with the establishment of the South American community of nations, which brings together all the actors in the region. The union by force, the Latin masses and more in major trade negotiations with the European Union and with partners in the North America (Cuba being a priori excluded from the free trade area of the Americas project). And Lula leading the dance, wanted to see the Brazil rewarded through more powers in international organizations, beginning with the United Nations. However, even with active the presence of its troops in the force of the peace in Haiti, it has no permanent seat on the Security Council. And multiple attempts to bring a Brazilian head of the World Trade Organization, of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Development Bank have remained fruitless.

Because Brazilian diplomats eventually stumble on the harsh realities of the region: the Brazil is too big, too strong to not appear suspicious in the eyes of historic as the Argentina rivals, or small countries such as the Uruguay. His vain faced nationalism in vogue in several countries of the region. Evo Morales has publicly Lula of "big brother", and the Brazil hoped preferential treatment in the episode of the nationalization of the gas industry. But the Bolivia actually tore the contracts negotiated between States, as part of a cooperation which was reinforced in several decades.

Still add the differences of political sensitivity between the pragmatism of Lula and revolutionary radicalism embodied by the President of the Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, prepared to finance the development of his country (and part of Argentina's debt) with oil money. The Chavez factor, revealed through the "Bolivarian alliance" project, in reference to the decolonization of the Spanish-speaking countries, especially scrambled cards that Lula thought it could tame colonel boiling, and Morales and Kirchner, in Argentina.

Error of assessment of his Adviser for International Affairs, or strategy of diplomacy at the Itamaraty Palace Difficult to distinguish things. The first, Marco Aurelio Garcia, had taken three years ago the initiative of a "group of friends of the Venezuela" in an attempt to bring Hugo Chavez more than moderation. Through its contacts with all the Latin American left, this former Professor at the Sorbonne at the time where the generals were in power in Brasilia, became later Secretary for International Affairs of the Party of Lula (which he still is Vice-President), thus has a complementary role of official diplomacy, led by Minister of External Relations Celso Amorim. Diplomacy with the purpose stated, and in part achieved, is to promote "a new trade geography" through the development of South-South trade.

The Bolivian glow coup, in which the military surrounded Petrobras refineries while technicians Venezuelans supplemented their local counterparts to return to the commands of the facilities, placed Brazilian diplomacy cantilever. In embarrassment, it is today open to criticism, especially on the part of former prominent ambassadors, who built a reputation for excellence of Itamaraty. One of them, Rubens Ricupero, former President of the UNCTAD, believes that a hard blow to the great design of regional integration. It recommends more firmness in respect of contracts, the defence of the interests of the Brazil and consumer of Bolivian gas incident. Ricupero knows whereof he speaks, because he participated in the negotiations for the construction of the pipeline between the Bolivia and the Brazil. Put into service in 1999, the pipeline more of 3,000 kilometres is far more concrete illustration of the process of energy integration regional.

In the eyes of these criticisms, the voluntarism of Brazilian diplomacy may cause the derailment of the process of integration. However, despite incidents of course, it is to recognize, as point out diplomats stationed in Brasilia, that Lula is now a preferred Washington in the region (the Brazil works in the fight against narco-traffickers in Colombia) and a factor of stabilization. The setbacks suffered by the "big brother" diplomacy without empire would, in this benevolent vision, that the symptoms of the assertion of power on the international scene.